1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

p. 38

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

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995 186 EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox [793] Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was 000 regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Zizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkivs'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkivs'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.[6]

This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkivs'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.[7] The practice of allow-

[6] The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" *(samosvjastvo)* and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkivs'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

[7] See *Dijannja Vseukraïns'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
● 793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *soborno-pravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

1; Reabetar 8-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

779 795 ● 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhiï Ukrains'koï Avtokefalnoï Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

779 795 793 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church, although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domination from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraïna Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

795 were turned down in an appeal to the Bulgarian Church and they obtained no response from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

●[793] Impressed by the sense of urgency and the justice of their cause, the leaders of the movement held a synod in Kiev on October 11, 1921 and proceeded to elect as bishops Father Vasyl Lypkivsky and Father Nestor Sharayevsky. Then, as they had no bishops available for their consecration, the members of the Sobor laid their hands upon them and consecrated them bishops without the participation of any bishops save relics of the saints preserved in Kiev. Lypkivsky was then made Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and he and his associate soon consecrated some 27 other bishops.

Yet the uncanonical nature of this original action drove a wedge between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the other Orthodox Churches and made certain that it would not later attract any validly consecrated bishops who would regularize the succession. On the other hand, other reforms, as the introduction of Ukrainian into the services in place of the old Church Slavonic, enabled the Russian opponents to classify it with the various movements as the Living Church which the Bolsheviks had fostered in their endeavor to disintegrate the Russian Church from within.

Still later, when the Orthodox in the succession states began to organize and came under the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose position had grown less critical with the strengthening of the new Turkey, it was too late for him to extend aid to the Ukrainian Orthodox as he did to those living under Polish rule by the recognition of a Polish Autocephalous Church in 1924. Thus the Ukrainian Orthodox were left almost completely isolated to face alone the atheistic Communist and imperialistic Russian Orthodox pressure.

Metropolitan Lypkivsky showed himself a very competent leader. The number of parishes under his control multiplied rapidly and by 1927 the Church had nearly 3,000 parishes and some 10,600 priests. It was no small achievement to establish and develop this under the harsh conditions of Soviet reality and for several years during the height of the movement of Ukrainization,

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration. 795

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination. 795 659

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced 795 [793]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Soviet service. It reopened churches that had been closed by 795
the Soviets and it cooperated with the Ukrainian patriotic movement.

With the return of the Soviet forces, the leaders of the Church retired to the west with a large part of the priests, and the others joined the underground. The Ukrainian Church was again suppressed and brought directly under the Patriarch of Moscow and it is to be noted that the head of the Orthodox Church in the UkSSR, does not hold any special point of honor as does the Catholicus of Georgia, who is still recognized as the head of a satellite Church.

It is thus safe to say that despite the continued existence of the UkSSR as an independent nation for the purposes of the United Nations, there is now no distinctive Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It has been swallowed, as in the days of Peter I, by the great Moscow religious imperialism. It has no independence and it is thoroughly and in all points independent upon the Russian Patriarch in Moscow.

B. The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite

When in 1939 the Soviet forces by their understanding with the Nazis occupied for the first time Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian lands, they at once set to work to remodel the area on their own standards and to eliminate all the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and culture. This process was, however, rudely interrupted by the German attack in 1941.

The dominant religion in the area was the Greek Catholic 795
Uniat Church, or, to be more precise, Catholicism of the Byzantine 793
Rite. The Metropolitan of this Church, Andry Sheptytsky, was the most respected figure in the entire area and he was a religious and cultural leader in every sense of the word. During this first occupation, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not personally disturbed but he was deprived of his liberty and forced into a semi-retirement. His schools and other institutions were closed, the Church was deprived of its property and a considerable number of priests were punished on various charges. Yet there was no general holocaust.

In 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was one of the leading figures

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
● 793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 795 793 661 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for their own use.

This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethnocentrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 565 795 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly, was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 186 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, subject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology."[45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*.

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diismist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diismist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor were shot by German police; the city passed under the control of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

priests who are no longer those of God' . . . and he called upon the high clergy to preach the Evangelical Fraternity of all men: 'Have you the right to call yourselves pastors of the Church and even to consider yourselves simply the faithful, if you despise your brother who is born, like you, of the baptismal water and devotion? Be he a serf, a skinner, a sadler, or a tailor, he is your brother, your equal.'

The old Slavonic, so much defended, was not after all sufficiently acceptable as a language of the 'serfs, skinners, sadlers, and tailors' for whom it was meant. Vichinsky was really among the first who brought their Slavonic nearer to the popular idiom. Others followed his example, among them Smotritsky and Zizany.

These beginnings of a broadly popularized literature in a language which was already being called 'Russian' and which we can consider as the old Ukrainian, nevertheless had no future. The intellectual evolution of Southern Russia took another course. Orthodoxy emerged victorious from the struggles which she had to endure, but at the same time she widely adopted, in the Ukraine, the literary forms and the ambiguous style of her adversaries, which excluded or strongly hindered the popular influences.

It is the name of the Metropolitan Peter Mohila, one of the most remarkable representatives of Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, which remains bound up with the new tendency of influencing intellectual Orthodox life by Latin scholasticism. Himself a descendant of a noble family of Moldavia, Mohila did not have the same bonds with the popular Ukrainian masses as the Orthodox preachers of the first heroic struggles. Very energetic, haughty, extremely violent in the method of his actions (according to his contemporaries he never hesitated to expel those monks who angered him from the monasteries,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

●793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Cholm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
[554] life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia*. The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia*.

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.): also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

[1] *Jawein Mesu'a: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower
szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands
of knights and barons who were often not much
richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely
Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still
whole villages in which every peasant belongs to
the nobility. Whoever was able to present his
patent of nobility in Galicia after the partition-
ing of Poland was recognized as a peer by the
Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter
/knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von
Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the except- 565
ion of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky 517
does not play any part in promoting culture in
modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793
were for a long time practically the only bearers
of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy
almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their
numerous children were often the only and the in-
exhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia.
Otherwise there were no intellectual professions
open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that
is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the
lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565
According to the latest Polish conception, the
lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles.
By promising them additional land and other
material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the
400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had suc-
ceeded, the Poles would have come a good deal
closer to a majority in Galicia.

*

"In this cottage, in this grove 539
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

•793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

23: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Ukraine RD1

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a " head " of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question : " Do you renounce the evil spirit? " To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply : " We renounce! " The priest next asks them : " Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ? " Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajlo, and Petro ; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church ; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

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[42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49 ; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50 ; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6 ; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.